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Summary
Taiwan still faces the problem of identifying its relationship and developing its atti-
tude within the Cross-Strait Relations, not only due to the well-known political consid-
erations and diplomatic isolation, but also because it is widely perceptible that Taiwan-
ese investors and the Taiwanese government are scared of the possible implications 
of a trade war between the USA and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, herein-
after: Mainland China). Besides other reasons, this is the main motivation behind 
the sudden Taiwanese FDI divestment from Mainland China. This huge amount of 
capital, however, does not return to Taiwan to create new jobs and develop new, high 
value-added industries, rather it flows to Southeast Asia, an area still focusing on the 
low-cost labour-intensive manufacturing sector. Besides other, non-industrial fields, 
the present NPP-based Tsai administration fosters its New Southbound Policy (NSP), 
which is partially implemented under the umbrella of a special NGO, the Taiwan– Asia 
Exchange Foundation (TAEF). The 18 target countries of NSP comprise the complete 
ASEAN plus South Asia, Australia and New Zealand. However, among Taiwan’s target 
countries, the most intensive investment and trade relations are maintained with the 
ASEAN region (mostly Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia). The 
future might, however, bring about significant changes, as Mainland China has still 
been by far the biggest export market of Taiwan. 
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Introduction – The antecedents and the objectives 
of the research
In 2017 the author spent two months with the research mobility fellowship of OBIC 
and made a thorough assessment of Taiwan’s developmental model, compared to 
South Korea, and discussed the constraints and endeavours to maintain Taiwan’s com-
petitiveness, including its external economic activities, with focus on Cross-Strait Rela-
tions and on the Taiwan–EU business and investment relations.
This research can be considered to directly follow from the above-mentioned pro-
ject. The author also gives a brief insight into the current state of affairs and into the 
most recent developments of the Taiwanese economy in general, and then Taiwan’s 
external economic relations are discussed with special focus on regional endeavours, 
primarily the New Southbound Policy (NSP), proclaimed by the incumbent Taiwanese 
President, Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 and targeting the South and Southeast Asian regions, 
including Australia and New Zealand, with a view to providing Taiwan a regional alter-
native against (or besides) Cross-Strait Relations. Tsai and the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) focus on Taiwan’s identity (and avoid the use of the term “independ-
ence”), and consider Taiwan’s overdependence on the excessive trade and investment 
relations with Mainland China as damaging, and consequently, the NSP-driven diver-
sification as a security issue. It is different question that in the future further impetus 
might be given to NSP or eventually drop it, turn back to Taiwan’s “Chinese identity” 
and further strengthen the Cross-Strait Relations. 
Material and methods
This paper is based on both secondary and primary research. Secondary research 
principally includes a literature review (literature available in Taiwanese libraries, 
mainly at the National Taiwan University and at the Shih Chien University). The statis-
tical data were collected from Taiwan, e.g. the Central Bank of the Republic of China, 
Taiwan (CBC), DGBAS (Treasury Department of the Ministry of Finance of Taiwan, 
Bureau of Trade, Statistical Office), the Directorate General of Customs, and the Fi-
nance Ministry of Taiwan), from the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of the Republic 
of China and from international databases (CIA World Factbook, IMF). Mention must 
be made of the author’s previous fellowship in Taiwan, his monograph (Neszmélyi, 
2017) and other publications of his, which also served as starting points for the cur-
rent research.
The author spent another month in Taiwan in 2019, as a fellow of the Oriental 
Business and Innovation Centre (OBIC) of the Budapest Business School, and this 
gave him a very good opportunity to re-establish and enlarge his personal contacts 
and carry out discussions, like in-depth interviews with a number of academic profes-
sionals and experts form the fields of business and administration (from Academia 
Sinica, Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, Shih Chien University, National Taipei 
University of Business, National Formosa University, CTBC Financial Holding and the 
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Hungarian Trade Office in Taipei). Hence, first-hand information and experiences 
contributed to the outcomes of this paper.
Taiwan’s current economic state and challenges 
General overview on Taiwan’s economy
Taiwan has a modern and developed economy with gradually shrinking government 
guidance of investment and foreign trade. Exports, led by electronics, machinery 
and petrochemicals provide the primary impetus to its economic development. This 
entails strong dependence on exports, which exposes the economy to fluctuations 
in world demand. Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, low birth rate and rapidly ageing 
population are other major long-term challenges. In the period of the author’s fel-
lowship (between 12 April and 12 May 2019), data for 2018 were still unavailable at 
the Central Bank of the Republic of China Taiwan (CBC), as the Annual Report for 
2018 was foreseen in June, 2019. Chin-Long Yang, Governor of CBC pointed out, that 
2017 had been a period of a steady global economic recovery and upswings in com-
modity prices, and these combined to drive Taiwan’s export expansion, as domestic 
consumer spending continued to moderately grow. Against this backdrop, Taiwan’s 
economy grew at a faster pace at 2.86 per cent, the highest annual growth rate in 
three years. Meanwhile, inflation was mild as NT dollar appreciation helped alleviate 
imported inflationary pressures, and a weather-induced higher base effect held down 
food prices. Compared to the previous year, the consumer price index (CPI) rose by 
0.62 per cent and the core CPI (excluding vegetable, fruit and energy prices) was up 
by 1.04 per cent (CBC, 2018).
According to the estimated data of The World Factbook of CIA (2019), Taiwan’s 
PPP-based GDP (purchasing power parity) was USD 1.189 trillion, GDP (at the official 
exchange rate) was USD 572.6 billion (2017), while real growth in GDP was 2.9 per 
cent (2017). The per capita GDP (PPP) was USD 50,500 (2017), while the ratio of gross 
national savings was 34.9 per cent of GDP (2017). In 2017, the contribution of sectors 
to GDP was as follows: agriculture (1.8 per cent), industry (36.0 per cent) and services 
(62.1 per cent). The main industries are: electronics, communications technological 
and information technological products, petroleum refining, chemicals, textiles, iron 
and steel, machinery, cement, food processing, vehicles, consumer products, and phar-
maceuticals. In 2017, the labour force was estimated at 11.78 million, in the following 
breakdown per sector: agriculture (4.9 per cent), industry (35.9 per cent) and services 
(59.2 per cent). The unemployment rate was 3.8 per cent in 2017, 0.1 per cent lower 
than in 2016 and identical to the data recorded in 2015. In 2016, the Taiwanese public 
debt was 35.7 per cent of GDP (0.5 per cent lower than a year earlier), while in 2017 the 
budget had a 0.1 per cent deficit (as against 0.6 per cent in 2016). In 2017, the inflation 
rate (consumer price index) was 1.1 per cent (CIA, 2019).
Growth was steady, with external demand acting as the main driver. As the global 
economic expansion continued, the annual GDP growth rate rose to 2.86 per cent. 
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The overall balance of payments recorded a surplus of USD 12.467 billion, with a cur-
rent account surplus and a net asset increase in the financial account. In terms of 
inflation, fuel and gas cost hikes in response to international energy price rises were 
partially offset by food price declines; the annual growth rate of the CPI averaged 0.62 
per cent for the year as whole. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate went further down 
to 3.76 per cent, the lowest in 17 years. While domestic demand kept steady, stronger 
external demand drove the economic growth rate to climb from 1.41 per cent in 2016 
to 2.86 per cent in 2017, the fastest pace in three years. In terms of GDP components 
by expenditure, exports registered faster growth on thriving trade activity, and imports 
increased along with greater domestic demand as well as export-driven demand; the 
net external demand contributed 2.02 percentage points to GDP growth, serving as 
the mainstay for economic growth in 2017. On the other hand, private consumption 
grew steadily amid improved employment conditions. However, this was partially offset 
by negative growth in private investment, as machinery equipment investment slowed 
in the second half of the year owing to a higher base effect. As a result, domestic 
demand contributed only 0.83 percentage points to GDP growth. The labour produc-
tivity indices of the industrial sector and of manufacturing also grew, an in the average 
non-agricultural (industrial and services) sectors, monthly earnings per employee in-
creased by 2.46 per cent year on year, reaching TWD 49,989. (The abbreviation TWD 
or NT$ means New Taiwanese Dollar, which is Taiwan’s official currency. In April and 
May 2019, USD 1 was equal to about TWD 30-31, and EUR 1 was around TWD 34). 
For the year 2017, the unemployment rate in general exhibited a downward trend, 
except in February (due to a typical wave of post-Lunar New Year job switching) and 
in June to August (as new graduates enter the job market) when seasonal factors 
resulted in higher unemployment. For the year as a whole, the unemployment rate 
was 3.76 per cent, the lowest in 17 years. As labour market conditions improved, un-
employment duration decreased by 0.85 weeks to 24.22 weeks. In terms of age, the 
unemployment duration of the age groups between 15-24 and 45-64 increased by 0.01 
and 0.24 weeks to 19.92 and 26.32 weeks, respectively, while that in the age group of 
25-44 decreased by 1.54 weeks to 25.47 weeks. The average number of the long-term 
unemployed (those who had been unemployed for 53 weeks or more) was 63 thou-
sand persons, a decrease by six thousand persons on a year earlier. In terms of causes 
of unemployment, total unemployment in year 2017 was 443 thousand persons, a de-
crease of 17 thousand persons or 3.52 per cent on the previous year, mainly because 
unemployment of experienced job seekers decreased by 12 thousand persons or 3.31 
per cent (CBC, 2018). 
The unity of the rapid and inductive interrelationship of the sciences and educa-
tion and implementation (best practice) triangle will gain increasing importance in 
the future (Zéman, 2016). It must be emphasized that 60 per cent of college graduates 
in Taiwan are engineers, many of whom establish ventures and most of them become 
successful in the course of a few years (Chou, 2017). However, another study points 
out that in the labour market the young generation (20-24 years old people) nowa-
days face even bigger difficulties than before (Hsu, 2015). In the course of the recent 
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decades, the labour market has undergone a thorough transformation, resulting new 
demand for both the demand and supply side (Erdeiné Késmárki-Gally, 2018). In Tai-
wan one of the main problems in the labour market is the stagnation of salaries, which 
is an obstacle to Taiwan’s economic growth (Wang, 2015). 
The main reasons of unemployment are shown in Chart 1.
Chart 1: The main reasons of unemployment in Taiwan (2016–2017)
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Source: CBC, 2018:26, based on data by DGBAS, Executive Yuan
It can be seen that both in 2016 and in 2017 the main cause was dissatisfaction with 
the original job, which further increased by 2017 relative to other factors calculated 
in the comparison.
Foreign trade and investment
In 2017, Taiwan’s external trade gathered steam amid a robust recovery in the global 
economy, while domestic demand witnessed a mild expansion. Private consumption 
rose at a steady pace, and despite a slight contraction seen in private investment, 
investments by the government and by public enterprises both exhibited positive 
growth. For the year as a whole, real GDP expanded at an annual growth rate of 2.86 
per cent, higher than the 1.41 per cent in the previous year (CBC, 2018).
In 2017, the total exports of Taiwan amounted to USD 349.8 (in 2016: USD 310.4 
billion), while the total amount of imports was USD 269 billion in 2017 (USD 239.3 
billion in 2016) (CIA, 2019).
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The main export commodities are: semiconductors, petrochemicals, automobile/
auto parts, ships, wireless communication equipment, flat displays, steel, electronics, 
plastics, computers, while the main items of imports: oil/petroleum, semiconductors, 
natural gas, coal, steel, computers, wireless communication equipment, automobiles, 
fine chemicals, textiles. Taiwan has the sixth biggest reserves of foreign exchange and 
gold the total amount of which was estimated USD 456.7 billion (on December 31, 
2017), while a year earlier it was USD 439 billion. Taiwan’s total amount of external 
debt was estimated at USD 181.9 billion (on 31 December, 2017) while one year be-
fore it was USD 172.2 billion (CIA, 2019).
According to customs statistics, the value of exports increased by 13.2 per cent 
to USD 317,381 million on free on board (FOB) parity, and the value of imports in-
creased by 12.5 per cent to USD 259,499 million on CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) 
basis. The biggest trading partners of Taiwan in 2017 were Mainland China including 
Hong Kong, ASEAN, the USA, Europe and Japan. In terms of Taiwan’s trade with 
Mainland China, the value of exports amounted to USD 130,280 million in 2017, 16.0 
per cent higher than in 2016. As a manufacturing hub of the world, Mainland China 
remained Taiwan’s biggest export market, with the share of total exports increased 
to 41.0 per cent in 2017. Of all major export products, parts of electronic products 
(especially integrated circuits) maintained their leading roles, contributing 7.8 per-
centage points to the growth in Taiwan’s exports to Mainland China. Imports from 
Mainland China increased by 13.8 per cent to USD 51,562 million in 2017. With a ra-
tio of 19.9 per cent, Mainland China continued to be Taiwan’s largest import partner. 
The trade surplus with Mainland China increased to USD 78,718 million in 2017. As a 
result, Mainland China remained the largest source of Taiwan’s trade surplus. Exports 
to the ASEAN economies increased by 14.2 per cent to USD 58,584 million in 2017, 
with a combined share of 18.5 per cent. Import from these countries increased by 14.4 
per cent to USD 31,058 million, representing a share of 12.0 per cent of total imports. 
The bilateral trade between Taiwan and the ASEAN heated up, and the exports and 
imports of parts of electronic products increased greatly. In sum, the trade surplus 
with the ASEAN increased to USD 27,526 million, with Singapore, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines being the second, third, and fourth largest sources of Taiwan’s trade sur-
plus, respectively. Exports to the US grew by 10.3 per cent to USD 36,976 million, 
though comprising a smaller share of 11.7 per cent in Taiwan’s total exports on a year 
earlier. Encouraged by bigger consumer demand for newer models of gaming laptops 
and commercial computers, information, communication and audio-video products 
exported to the US increased by 16.8 per cent over the previous year. Imports from 
the US rose by 5.6 per cent to USD 30,210 million, but its share in total imports fell 
to 11.6 per cent. The trade surplus with the US, Taiwan’s fifth largest surplus source, 
increased to USD 6,766 million. Europe’s gradual recovery combined with a stronger 
euro, allowed Taiwanese exports to Europe to increase by 11.2 per cent to USD 29,162 
million, yet its share of total exports declined to 9.2 per cent. Taiwanese exports of 
machinery and base metals soared especially well among major products, growing 
by 22.5 per cent and 16.1 per cent from a year earlier, respectively. Taiwan’s import 
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from Europe increased by 8.7 per cent to USD 31,452 million, though its share of 
total imports decreased to 12.1 per cent. Consequently, Taiwan’s trade deficit with 
Europe shrank to USD 2,290 million in 2017. Taiwan’s exports to Japan increased by 
6.3 per cent to USD 20,787 million, with its share declining to 6.5 per cent (exports of 
machinery and base metals made the biggest contribution to total exports). Taiwan’s 
import from Japan increased by 3.3 per cent to USD 41,950 million, and its share 
dropped to 16.2 per cent of the total imports. Japan remained Taiwan’s second largest 
source of imports in 2017. In sum, the trade deficit to Japan increased to USD 21,163 
million per year (CBC, 2018). The main trading partners of Taiwan in 2017 and 2016 
can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1: Taiwan’s trade of goods by country in 2016 and 2017
2017 2016
Amount Share
Annual 
change
Amount Share
Annual 
change
Exports million USD  per cent  per cent million USD  per cent  per cent
Mainland China  
(incl. Hong Kong)
130,280 41.0 16.0 112,277 40.1 –0.2
ASEAN 58,584 18.5 14.2 51,291 18.3 –0.7
USA 36,976 11.7 10.3 33,523 12.0 –3.0
Europe 29,162 9.2 11.2 26,221 9.4 1.0
Japan 20,787 6.5 6.3 19,551 7.0 –0.2
Rest of the World 41,592 13.1 11.0 37,459 13.4 –8.8
Total 317,381 100.0 13.2 280,321 100.0 –1.8
Imports
Mainland China  
(incl. Hong Kong)
51,562 19.9 13.8 45,321 19.7 –3.0
Japan 41,950 16.2 3.3 40,622 17.6 4.5
Europe 31,452 12.1 8.7 28,924 12.5 1.5
ASEAN 31,058 12.0 14.4 27,155 11.8 –6.5
USA 30,210 11.6 5.6 28,597 12.4 –2.1
Rest of the World 73,267 28.2 22.2 59,949 26.0 –7.6
Total 259,499 100.0 12.5 230,568 100.0 –2.8
Source: The author’s editing from CBC, 2018:16 (on the basis of Monthly Statistics of Exports and Im-
ports, Ministry of Finance of Taiwan)
The most recent traits in the Taiwanese economy
According to the recent survey and forecast of the Taiwan Institute of Economic Re-
search (TIER), published in April 2019, global demand has turned weaker, therefore 
the major central banks in the world simultaneously conduct looser monetary opera-
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tions. Both of the most recently published composite indicators for manufacturing 
and service go up due to more promising domestic investment activities despite of de-
teriorating global economic conditions. As a result, it is predicted that Taiwan’s GDP 
will grow by 2.12 per cent in 2019 (the same as it was stated in its previous forecast). In 
March 2019, Taiwan’s exports decreased by 4.36 per cent on a year earlier, represent-
ing a decrease for 5 consecutive months. In March 2019, Taiwan’s imports increased 
by 6.62 per cent on a year earlier. On a cumulated basis, between January and the end 
of March this year exports and imports yielded a trade surplus of USD 8.96 billion 
or decreased by 23.75 per cent year on year. The CPI increased by 0.58 per cent in 
March 2019 relative to the same month of the previous year. The core inflation rate, 
excluding energy prices and food grew by 0.47 per cent in March 2019. In addition, 
the wholesale price index (WPI) moved up by 1.19 per cent in March 2019 year on 
year. As for the exchange rate, similarly to all other major currencies in the world, the 
NTD became slightly weaker due to the strengthening of the USD. The NTD/USD 
rate stood at 30.825 in late March 2019, indicating 0.16 per cent depreciation. The 
interest rate remained low and steady in March 2019 due to the continued loose mon-
etary operations by the CBC with respect to the most recent CPI reading and potential 
global uncertainties; the lowest and highest over-night call rate in March 2019 stood 
at 0.174 per cent and 0.186 per cent, respectively (TIER, 2019).
The ratio of manufacturing firms which considered business to be better than 
expected in March 2019 was 46.5 per cent, representing an increase by 35.0 percent-
age points compared to respondents who perceived better business in the previous 
month. The ratio of those who perceived business getting worse in March 2019 was 
11.6 per cent, down 38.5 per cent on the 50.1 per cent expecting worse business in 
the previous month (February 2019). The ratio of manufacturing companies that 
thought business had remained unchanged in March 2019 was 41.9 per cent or in-
creased by 3.5 percentage points compared to 38.4 per cent perceiving constant busi-
ness in the previous month. Altogether, manufacturing firms were more optimistic 
about business in March 2019 than in the previous month. However, the actual reason 
was the higher number of working days in March than in February due to the lunar 
New Year holiday. In addition, the ratio of manufacturers who were of the opinion 
that business would be better in the following six months (between April and Sep-
tember, 2019) was 32.8 per cent in the target month or decreased by 12.8 percentage 
points on the 45.6 per cent who felt more optimistic about the future in the previous 
month. The ratio of firms that perceived the economic outlook would be worsening 
was 15.5 per cent, representing an increase by 6.2 percentage points compared to 
the 9.3 per cent feeling rather pessimistic about the future in the previous month. 
The ratio of manufacturing companies which perceived that business would remain 
unchanged in the next six months (between April and September 2019) stood at 51.7 
per cent, an increase by 6.6 percentage points compared to the 45.1 per cent who felt 
neutral about the business outlook one month earlier. After all, manufacturing firms 
were more pessimistic about business in the near future than in the preceding month 
(i.e. February, 2019) (TIER, 2019).
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The Manufacturing Composite Index for March 2019, adjusted for seasonal fac-
tors on a moving average, saw an upward correction: from a revision of 91.23 points in 
February 2019 it increased to 95.93 points. Chart 1 shows an increase by 4.70 points, 
which is an increase for the fourth month in a row. The TIER Service Sector Com-
posite Index for March 2019 adjusted for seasonal factors on a moving average, also 
saw an upward correction from a revision of 91.25 points in February 2019 to 96.76 
points. Chart 2 shows an increase of 5.51 points, the first increase after a one-month 
drop. In addition, the TIER construction sector composite indicator for March 2019, 
adjusted for seasonal factors on a moving average, saw a downward correction: from a 
revision of 94.13 points in February 2019 to 91.18 points. Chart 2 shows a decrease of 
2.95 points, the first decrease after a one-month rise (TIER, 2019).
Chart 2: TIER Business Composite Index of the Taiwanese economy
Manufacturing 95.93(2019/03) +4.70
Service 96.76(2019/03) +5.51
Construction 91.78(2019/03) –2.95
2006=100
2014 15 16 17 18
Source: TIER, 2019:6, (March)
The TIER economic survey forecasts lower economic growth for the first half of 
2019, and a more rapid GDP growth for 2019 Q3 and Q4, reaching 2.51 per cent by 
the end of the year (see Table 2).
Lin1 highlighted that as the Taiwanese capital returning from Mainland China 
seeks fast and high return, it goes either to the real estate market or abroad again. 
Two factors contribute to this phenomenon. In Taiwan, real estate prices are extreme-
ly high while the property tax is low compared to the United States and to several 
European countries, where it is around 1 per cent against Taiwan, where it is only 
around 0.1 percent. (It cannot enter the real estate market in Mainland China, as 
there is no property there, people may only obtain the right of using a property for 
70 years). The other factor is that in other countries, like in Southeast Asia, economic 
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growth is faster, while the wage level remains considerably lower than in Taiwan: Viet-
nam, the Philippines and other states provide Taiwanese investors with higher profits. 
Moreover, the government supports this under the auspices of the New Southbound 
Policy. For this reason, it is not surprising that the Taiwanese capital does not flow into 
Taiwanese manufacturing or into services, which results in the scarcity of jobs and 
preserves the relatively high but permanently stable wage level. Stringent wages tend 
to freeze domestic savings as well (Sági–Sóvágó, 2002), which may, in turn, influence 
market agents in their investments (Sági, 2007). Taiwan’s domestic financial market is 
very strictly regulated, and this is one more reason why capital still flows out, rather to 
or through Hong Kong or Singapore (Lin, 2019). 
Chung2 underlined the fact that that Taiwan is in scarcity of most production fac-
tors (land, energy, raw materials, labour, etc.), this is the reason why Taiwanese capital 
– returning from Mainland China – goes rather to Southeast Asia, then to the domes-
tic industry. This looks to be a general phenomenon that capital has no “national 
emotions” and goes where the return/profit is the highest, but the situation is more 
complex. The labour-intensive manufacturing industry, which is principally based on 
low-cost labour, has no way and reason to be further developed in Taiwan, where 
wages are significantly higher than in most of the Southeast Asian countries. Taiwan’s 
government offers special incentives to develop Taiwan’s knowledge-intensive sectors, 
like the “green industries”. There are projects for sustainable power generation (like 
coastal powerhouses using the wave-energy of the ocean, projects many foreign com-
panies seek to join (Chung, 2019).
The New Southbound Policy and its implications
The global and domestic circumstances of Taiwan’s economy have undergone rapid 
changes in recent years. Mainland China faces a number of difficulties after three 
decades of rapid and uninterrupted economic development, such as industrial 
structural transformation, adjustments in laws and institutions, a sharp increase in 
production costs, and a slowdown in economic growth. At the same time the most 
prominent Southeast and South Asian economies have still continued to grow, and 
their consumers’ purchasing power has also been increasing. These countries also 
actively participate in regional economic integrations with a view to improving their 
companies’ competitiveness and to achieving even better business opportunities. This 
region has emerged as one of the present – and future  – locomotives of the global 
economy. The aggregate GDP of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), having a population of approximately 620 million, is USD 
2.4 trillion. Moreover, the six South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan) have a total population of nearly 1.7 billion and their 
GDP amounted to USD 2.7 trillion. According to Global Insight forecasts, the average 
annual economic growth rates for the ASEAN and South Asian countries would reach 
4.9 per cent and 7.4 per cent, respectively, between 2017 and 2021. This is consider-
ably higher than the 3.1 per cent global economic average growth rate. As a result of 
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Table 2: Taiwan’s economic forecast for 2019 (TWD 100 million, Chained [2011], USD)
2019 2019
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
GDP 40,961 42,034 43,722 44,971 171,688
Real GDP (%) 1.80 1.85 2.30 2.51 2.12
Private Consumption 23,559 23,353 23,820 23,798 94,530
Private Consumption (%) 2.15 2.20 2.40 2.43 2.30
Gov’t Consumption 5,452 5,864 6,186 6,736 24,238
Gov’t Consumption (%) –2.55 –3.32 3.40 2.03 –0.03
Fixed Capital Formation 9,153 9,486 10,308 10,206 39,153
Fixed Capital Formation (%) 3.78 6.15 4.09 7.40 5.36
Gov’t Investment 922 1,230 1,343 1,928 5,422
Gov’t Investment (%) 8.59 11.92 12.02 13.62 11.96
Public Enter. Invest. 353 566 545 965 2,429
Public Enter. Invest. (%) 7.24 17.42 7.92 4.92 8.63
Private Investment 7,878 7,690 8,422 7,313 31,304
Private Investment (%) 3.20 4.60 2.80 6.10 4.10
Exports, goods + services 
(USD 0.1 billion)
30,480 31,697 34,415 35,725 132,318
Exports, goods +services (%) 0.30 1.70 2.95 3.15 2.08
Imports, goods +services 
(USD 0.1 billion)
28,229 28,615 31,300 31,865 120,009
Imports, goods +services (%) 1.45 2.40 3.25 3.75 2.75
Exports, goods (USD 0.1 billion) 764 832 883 892 3,371
Exports, % Growth, yoy –4.19 –1.05 2.40 3.90 0.36
Imports, goods (USD 0.1 billion) 674 708 759 754 2,895
Imports, % Growth, yoy –0.81 0.80 1.20 3.06 1.10
Trade surplus (USD 0.1 billion) 90 124 125 138 476
CPI 101.85 102.34 103.35 103.63 102.79
CPI (%) 0.33 0.45 0.85 1.55 0.80
WPI 102.67 104.49 106.53 105.80 104.87
WPI (%) 0.72 0.20 –0.30 0.60 0.30
Exchange rate (TWD/USD) 30.83 30.85 30.83 30.70 30.80
Source: TIER, 2019
this spectacular growth, in these countries a new middle class will emerge with higher 
purchasing power, which means excellent business opportunities even for Taiwanese 
companies. Taiwan is entering a critical period of industrial transformation and struc-
tural adjustment, with the wage growth still remaining stable. Although Taiwan previ-
ously maintained trade and economic relations with many emerging markets in Asia, 
most of them were based on export processing and related investment, not on the 
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local markets. Furthermore, the majority of the exported manufactured goods had 
little value added. As Taiwan faces difficulties in participating in regional economic 
integrations, its export items are only affected by tariffs and trade barriers, all these 
problems mean a significant constraint for Taiwan to foster its exports and economic 
growth. Another problem is that Taiwan also has a high concentration of trade and 
outbound investment in mainland China, which means potential risks to Taiwan’s 
economy and security (An Introductory Guide, 2017).
Lőrincz (2019) underlines that Taiwan has nearly reached a stalemate in the Cross-
Strait Relations, and therefore breaking out of diplomatic isolation clearly seems to 
be an abortive attempt. In the recent years additional 2-3 countries have left the “pri-
vate club” of countries which still recognize Taiwan as an independent country. The 
tiny state of Eswatini (Swaziland) remained the only one in the African continent 
and not a single significant economic and political power can be found among the 
other ones (the Holy See, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay). Other attempts to get admitted 
into international organizations, like the World Health Organization (WHO) of the 
United Nations, have also failed. But, on the other hand, based on the robust exports, 
the Taiwanese economy works well, and as from the perspective of the Southeast Asian 
countries, Taiwan seems to be a success story, a developed and rich economy, it is 
a promising partner for co-operation. For many ASEAN citizens, Taiwan provides 
livelihood, as they were allowed to enter and stay as guest workers (several hundred 
thousand people from the ASEAN region, mainly from the Philippines, Indonesia 
and Vietnam). The Taiwanese environment is friendly to them, there is no discrimi-
nation against foreigners, against Muslims, and there are no anti-migrant rallies etc. 
(Lőrincz, 2019).
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Taiwan needed a firm diver-
sification in its strategy for economic and foreign relations. The most logical choice 
was to diversify these relations by intensifying co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region, 
which is in the direct geographical proximity of Taiwan. In her inaugural speech 
made in 2016, the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen emphasized the significance of 
the New Southbound Policy to improve Taiwan’s stance and versatility in the interna-
tional economy, pointing out that Taiwan should give up reliance on a single market 
(Mainland China), and should re-establish and intensify ties with other Asian econo-
mies. Taiwan’s trade ties with the ASEAN countries have gained rapid traction in re-
cent years. Exports to the region reached USD 32.90 billion in the first seven months 
of 2017, an increase of 14.73 percent from the same period last year. Outbound ship-
ments to South Asia totalled above USD 2.9 billion in the first 7 months, risen by 10.29 
percent on a year earlier and having reversed a decline by 3.87 percent for the entire 
year of 2016. Taiwanese firms have made hefty investments in the region, with Taiwan-
ese direct investments adding up to USD 97 billion, according to official government 
tallies. Taiwan’s key economic strengths include advanced technology, talented peo-
ple and a diversified culture, and the New Southbound Policy consequently intends 
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to promote co-operation with the target countries in fields such as medical care, edu-
cation, technology, agriculture, and tourism. With a high degree of complementarity 
between Taiwan and the partner countries, the government has encouraged supply 
chain integration in such sectors as information and communications technology 
(ICT), industries driven by domestic demand, energy and petrochemicals, agricul-
ture, and financial services. An example is MediaTek Inc, the world’s top contract chip 
designer, with its headquarters in Hsinchu, Taiwan. In December 2019, MediaTek in-
vited 42 executives and senior engineers from Indian smartphone vendors, including 
Micromax Informatics Ltd, to take part in a six-week handset hardware design devel-
opment program in Taiwan. The program made a substantial contribution to helping 
India (An Introductory Guide, 2017).
Main targets: the emerging South and Southeast Asian countries
Despite the recent financial crisis in the Far East, the ASEAN region has managed to 
hold its position as one of the most rapidly developing regions in the world economy. 
The member states express keen interest in broadening the forms of co-operation 
with one another. In January, 1992 ASEAN announced the future development of 
AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) for the period between 1993 and 2008, with the 
gradual phasing out of customs restrictions within the Association. In 1995 the dead-
line for the completion of AFTA was brought forward to 2003. In the course of the 
half-century history of the Association, ASEAN members have been among the most 
spectacularly developing countries in the world. According to competent analysts, the 
economy has been continuing to grow rapidly in the forthcoming years (see Table 3). 
The member countries in total represent a population of 622 million people, which 
– in case of the continuation of the economic growth and increasing incomes – may 
expect considerable growth in their consumption for the coming decades. In terms of 
population, ASEAN is bigger than the European Union or the United States; it is the 
3rd largest market in the world, behind only India and China. ASEAN is a fast growing 
and promising region. Its total trade increased by nearly USD 1 trillion between 2007 
and 2014, with intra-ASEAN trade comprising the largest share of ASEAN’s total trade 
by partner. ASEAN attracted USD 136 billion in FDI in 2014, accounting for 11 per 
cent of global FDI inflows, up from only 5 per cent in 2007 (Neszmélyi–Kozár, 2018).
The most recent milestone in the economic integration process of Southeast Asia 
was formal establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) on 31st Decem-
ber 2015 which was built on four interrelated and mutually-reinforcing characteristics: 
(a) a single market and production base, (b) a highly competitive economic region, 
(c) a region of equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully integrated 
into the global economy. ASEAN is nowadays is a highly competitive economic region 
in the world with a combined GDP of USD 2.6 trillion in 2014, ASEAN economy was 
7th largest in the world and the 3rd largest in Asia. The formal establishment of the 
AEC in 2015 is not a static end goal, but a dynamic process that requires continuous 
reinvention of the region to maintain its relevance in an evolving global economy. 
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The agenda “AEC Blueprint 2025” has therefore been adopted in order to guide 
ASEAN economic integration between 2016 and 2025 (AEC, 2015).
Bagla3 underlined, that India is the world largest recipient of foreign investments 
and has the world’s highest rate of economic growth. India has a huge and young 
population. In the future these young India and will provide the momentum for in-
novation. This offers great opportunity and a huge market for IT business, which will 
continue to carry out innovation. In this respect, it can be predicted that Taiwanese 
investment in India will continue to grow (TAEF, 2019).
Table 3: Real GDP Growth in Southeast Asia, China and India. Annual percentage change
2017 2018 2019
2019–23 
(average)
2012–16 
(average)
Indonesia 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3
Malaysia 5.9 4.9 4.8 4.6 5.1
Philippines 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6
Thailand 3.9 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4
Vietnam 6.8 6.9 6.7 6.5 5.9
Brunei 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.0 –1.3
Singapore 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.7 3.5
Cambodia 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.9 7.1
Laos 6.9 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.6
Myanmar 6.8 6.6 6.9 7.0 7.3
China 6.9 6.6 6.3 5.9 7.3
India 6.7 7.5 7.3 7.3 6.9
Average of ASEAN-10 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1
Average of Emerging Asia 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.1 6.8
Source: OECD, 2018:1
Taiwan and the Southeast-Asian countries
Taiwan has developed close ties with Southeast Asian countries over the past three 
decades. The interconnected trade and investment flows have formed deep economic 
interdependence and de facto integration in the region. The trend of Taiwanese en-
terprises relocating from China to Southeast Asia has been observed since the late 
2000s. This explains the economic considerations and rationale behind the New 
Southbound Policy (Hsu, 2017). 
Yang (2017) reiterated that the relationship between Taiwan and Asian countries 
has been is undergoing structural change that derives from the continuous bilateral 
interaction since the 1970s. The internal driving force behind these relationships on 
Taiwanese side is the Taiwan government’s foreign policies and their impact on the 
private sector’s capacity to expand the global and regional industrial chain and invest-
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ment network. The Taiwanese government has launched a number of regional initia-
tives with the view of fostering the regional strategic, economic, and trade relations in 
the Asia-Pacific area, which would bring about constructive partnerships for Taiwan 
while creating mutual understanding with its neighbours as well. In the 1990s, Presi-
dent Lee Teng-hui announced his Go South Policy which led to Taiwanese state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) investing in Southeast Asia and encouraged domestic small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to look for business opportunities in the region. 
Its continuation was the No. 2 phase of Go South supported by President Chen Shui-
bian, during the 2000s when Taiwan adopted a “balanced westward” approach to 
regional investment and trade strategy (Yang, 2017). 
Hsiao4 (2019) confirmed that Taiwan’s government proclaimed its original South-
bound Policy (Go South) in 1994, since then the above-mentioned two phases were 
implemented before 2016 when the Tsai-administration launched its third Step, the 
New Southbound Policy with the view of expanding relations with Southeast Asian 
countries, Australia and New Zealand. While many countries in the region have start-
ed similar programmes (South Korea has its own NSP, India has a Go East policy, etc.), 
in case of Taiwan it is unique that the program is implemented like a PPP (Public-Pri-
vate Partnership). Due to the diplomatic isolation the Taiwanese government has very 
limited possibilities to act directly abroad, however its role is in rendering financial 
instruments to the investment projects. The second “P” means a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) – the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF) – that acts as an 
umbrella organization that takes care of projects in various fields, like co-operation 
in health, agricultural, education and cultural and youth exchanges. An additional 
– and important – field of co-operation is resilience and post-disaster resilience (like 
earthquakes) (Hsiao, 2019).
The Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF) was established in 2018 as the 
first policy-oriented think tank in Taiwan with a focus on Southeast Asian and South 
Asian region. Under the auspices of the New Southbound Policy (NSP), the goal of 
the TAEF is to promote comprehensive ties between Taiwan and the 10 ASEAN coun-
tries, 6 South Asian states, as well as Australia and New Zealand through co-operation 
and exchanges in three major fields – including think tanks, non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) and young leaders – to consolidate a sense of regional com-
munity in Asia and establish long-term co-operative partnerships. TAEF is devoted 
to building new mechanisms for regional co-operation among Asian societies. It is 
our goal to cultivate common policy blueprints for Taiwan, ASEAN and South Asian 
countries through frequent regional dialogue, while also highlighting Taiwan’s com-
mitment and contributions towards Asia’s development through concrete initiatives 
for co-operation. In addition, the TAEF hosts various international conferences – in-
cluding the Yushan Forum: Asian Dialogue for Innovation and Progress – with the 
aim of strengthening ties with New Southbound Policy partner states and societies, 
while also inviting other like-minded countries to participate in regional dialogue. 
TAEF has a three-bounded mission in terms of expanding Taiwan’s regional relation-
ships as follows:
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– Fostering think tank co-operation by building domestic and international think 
tank networks to increase capabilities on academic co-operation, encourage interna-
tional exchange, and promote the New Southbound Policy.
– Supporting civil society partnerships by launching the “Asian Double Helix Ini-
tiative” on regional youth leadership; encouraging diverse ties between Asian NGOs 
and civil societies, and promoting public diplomacy and social participation.
– In addition, it has the role as a pilot think tank by engaging in in-depth policy 
research to strengthen Taiwan’s contributions to Asian studies, and develop joint task 
forces on international policy co-operation (TAEF, 2018).
The NSP comprises 16 partner countries (10 ASEAN members, India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Australia, New Zealand) from among them 8 ones 
are considered priority-partners, like Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singa-
pore, Australia, Indonesia and India. The NSP is a possible way for Taiwan to diversify 
its business and investment activities in the Southeast Asian region as now it is visible 
that Taiwan became too much focused on – and became dependent on – Mainland 
China. Even though during the recent two decades ten billions of USD Taiwanese capi-
tal flew into Mainland China, now the Cross-Strait Relations tending to be in a stale-
mate, so the Taiwanese government has been preparing to receive and re-direct the re-
turning capital from Mainland China. The majority of this capital would, nevertheless, 
not remain in Taiwan, it goes abroad into the various “southbound” partners, e.g. to 
Vietnam. He added that the Cross-Strait Relations are “frozen” in the recent two years, 
from Taiwan’s point of view there is no remarkable development, so Taiwan needs 
new partners and in parallel needs to gradually withdrew from the unilateral-sound 
dependence on Mainland China in terms of trade and investment (Hsiao, 2019).
Lin underlined that the New Southbound Policy would ease Taiwan’s isolation at 
least in terms of business. The previous phases of Southward policies in the 1990’s 
could still not be really successful, but in the ASEAN region many positive changes 
happened since then. The ASEAN region is one of the most rapidly growing regions 
in the world, with gradually increasing purchasing power, consumer demands and 
increasing openness to the e-commerce as well. So, the New Southbound Policy is the 
“new hope” for Taiwan. Contrary to South Asia, in most ASEAN members the cultural 
background has many similarities. (The common background is the Chinese cultural 
roots and the Chinese communities living there.) Another interesting and common 
point he added is that Taiwanese men brought a high number of wives from Southeast 
Asia to Taiwan. Nowadays one fifth, or 20 per cent, of the new-born babies in Taiwan 
have Southeast Asian roots (Lin, 2019).
The following diagrams (Chart 3 and Chart 4) illustrate the Cross-Strait trade and in-
vestment data of the NSP partner countries. It is clearly visible that since the early 2010’s 
Taiwanese FDI investment to Mainland China has been decreasing, but despitethe de-
clining trend, up to early 2017 it still remained higher than investments in the NSP tar-
get countries. The Taiwanese exports show an increasing trend both to Mainland China 
and to the NDP target countries, and since 2003, in absolute terms, exports to Mainland 
China had still been higher than to the NSP target countries until 2017. 
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Chart 3:  Taiwan’s outbound investment into Mainland China and into NSP target countries, 
USD billion
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Chart 4: Taiwan’s exports to Mainland China and to NSP target countries, USD billion
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With the announcement of its New Southbound Policy in 2016, the Taiwanese gov-
ernment signalled its commitment to help businesses expand abroad. Whether they 
were already moving southward or making efforts at doing so, companies could also 
start to see the benefits of this policy. The data evidence the success of this policy, be-
tween January and August 2018: trade with the 18 partner nations grew by 5.5 percent 
on the previous year, according to the Office of Trade Negotiations of the Executive 
Yuan (Taiwan’s Government). The successes go beyond the bottom line – a major 
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feature of the policy is its focus on long-term development and efforts to forge a sense 
of economic community, and government agencies have responded with an array of 
resources to achieve these goals (Progress and Prospects, 2018). 
Among the NSP target countries Taiwan transacts the largest volume of exports to 
the ASEAN countries, compared to the ASEAN 10, hence so far South Asia, Australia 
and New Zealand has seemed to be relatively smaller export markets for Taiwan as it 
can be seen in Chart 5.
Chart 5: Regional distribution of Taiwan’s exports among the NSP target countries 
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Chart 6: The rationale of the New Southbound Policy of Taiwan
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Taiwan is open towards Southeast Asia including countries with Muslim popula-
tions. The citizens of Southeast Asian countries are allowed to come to Taiwan to 
work, and there are probably about 170,000 Southeast Asian wives who have moved 
and married Taiwanese men. Taiwan prepares to even more efficiently co-operate 
with Muslim-oriented markets in the region, for example by developing and selling 
slaughtering and processing technologies for Halal food (Hsiao, 2019). Yang (2017) 
also emphasizes that in parallel with the government’s commitment to the New South-
bound Policy, a reform process was initiated in the Taiwanese tourism industry, men-
tioning as an example that halal certifications were awarded to more than a hundred 
restaurants and hotels to symbolize that Taiwan is becoming a Muslim-friendly envi-
ronment. A new Taiwan Halal Centre, opened in Taipei in April 2017, would improve 
understanding Muslim norms and markets in Taiwan (Yang, 2017).
Glaser5 et al. (2018) warned about the “China factor” that could be an obstacle to 
the New Southbound Policy. Southeast Asian countries may be hesitant to co-operate 
with Taiwan, as they are worried about China’s retaliation, despite the fact that the 
New Southbound Policy could be a good start and suggests that Taiwan should co-
ordinate its efforts with the Indo-Pacific strategy of the USA (TAEF, 2019).
Contrary to the above, Hsiao ruled out this scenario emphasizing, that the ASEAN 
countries can freely do business with Mainland China. Taiwan does not want to hin-
der it, through the NSP, the government only wants these countries to do business 
with Taiwan as well. After all, the growing foreign trade and investment data justify 
the success of the New Southbound Policy of Taiwan. By diversification, by a techno-
logical upgrade and by developing new industries, Taiwan might prevent the loss of 
its advanced position and maintain its competitiveness. It is now very clearly visible 
that closer co-operation with Mainland China will not help this process, rather, it will 
further shrink Taiwan’s space of mobility in the international markets (Hsiao, 2019). 
By distributing tasks among the governmental organizations, the Taiwanese govern-
ment provided significantly increased financial instruments in support of the goals of 
the NSP. The budgetary allocation of the New Southbound Policy is shown in Table 4.
Table 4:  The budget allocations for the New Southbound Policy for the financial years 2017 
and 2018 (in million TWD)
2018 NSP 
Budget
NSP as per cent 
of 2018 Budget
2017 NSP 
Budget
NSP as per cent 
of 2017 Budget
Change
Total Budget 7,255 – 4,452 – 63 per cent
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
323 1.2 per cent 260 1.1 per cent 24 per cent
Ministry of 
Education 
1,696 0.7 per cent 1,000 0.4 per cent 70 per cent
Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs
2,891 5.3 per cent 1,745 3.3 per cent 66 per cent
Tourism Bureau 320 6.6 per cent 218 4.1 per cent 47 per cent
Source: Glaser et al., 2018:5
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Hsiao (2019) emphasises that the NSP is not competing and not against Mainland 
China’s international business and investment endeavours. NSP partner countries 
may freely do business with Mainland China, and in addition (but not instead) they 
should also co-operate and do business with Taiwan. It is clearly visible in Chart 7 that 
since the early 2000’s Mainland China has had higher exports to the NSP partner 
countries and Chart 8 also shows that since 2007 Mainland China has invested more 
capital in the mentioned partner countries than Taiwan. Mainland China does not 
really care about the NSP, as it does not extend to the field of international political 
relations (even the partner countries would refrain from having this field engaged 
in the co-operation). Nevertheless, China’s geostrategic ambitions are changing and 
extending beyond the South and Southeast Asian regions, as it is clearly perceptible 
in the New Silk Road Initiative (Engelberth–Sági, 2017).
Chart 7: Mainland China and Taiwan’s exports to NSP target countries (USD billion)
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Chart 8:  Mainland China and Taiwan’s outbound investment into NSP target countries 
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The current situation in the Cross-Strait Relations
The NPP-based Tsai-administration has good relations with the USA and Japan, while 
the Cross-Strait Relations have become chilly. Tsai does not recognize the 1992 Con-
sensus, in other words, the One-China Policy, while Kuomintang (KMT) has accepted 
it (Lin, 2019). Hence, it is not surprising that the stance of Mainland China is reserved 
and negative towards the Tsai-cabinet and the NPP. Ma Xiaoguang6 points out that the 
1992 Consensus is the common political foundation for development of the Cross-
Strait Relations. It reflects adherence to the One China principle by both sides in 
their efforts to seek national reunification, so it clearly defines the characteristics of 
the relationship. He warns against moving further along this “separatist stance” and 
attempts at seeking personal benefits by hyping confrontation and hostility between 
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, which undermines Cross-Strait ties. The One Coun-
try – Two Systems principle is an institutional arrangement after national reunification 
is achieved, and by purposefully confusing the 1992 Consensus and the mentioned 
principle, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party is deliberately misleading 
the people of Taiwan (Xinhuanet, 2019).
Wang et al. (2018) emphasize that the content of the 1992 Consensus is, in fact, 
quite complex. First, both sides have different definitions and interpretations of the 
term. The incumbent Chinese Communist Party evokes the term to indicate that both 
the Mainland and Taiwan belong to “one China”, and both sides have a prospective 
of an ultimate unification in the One Country – Two Systems framework. The Consensus 
in Taiwan is interpreted differently. The Kuomintang (KMT) that signed and adopted 
the Consensus argues that it simply indicates that both the Mainland and Taiwan 
belong to one China; however, the interpretations of “China” are different on both 
sides. For (Mainland) China, the “One China” term refers to the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), but for Taiwan, “One China” refers to “the Republic of China (ROC)” 
(Wang et al., 2018).
Lin adds that investment activities of companies from Mainland China in Taiwan 
are also very strictly regulated. Furthermore, Taiwan still faces structural problems in 
its economy, as the services sector’s contribution to GDP is still low, around 60 per 
cent, and the ratio of employment is similar, which means the value added content of 
the Taiwanese economy is still low compared to developed economies like the USA, 
the UK, etc., where the services sector contributes over 75 per cent to GDP. He adds 
that although under the Tsai administration Cross-Strait Relations worsened, business 
still goes on. The main reason for Taiwanese capital flowing back of Mainland China 
is not the security risk, but the fact that the investors who invested into the manufac-
turing industry in Mainland China during the 1980-1990’s are getting old now, and 
their children, the upcoming generation, do not want to take over the business, as it 
is usually labour-intensive, low value-added manufacturing. Another reason for Tai-
wanese divestment in Mainland China is the trade war between China and the United 
States. If Taiwanese firms remained, they would also be hit by the high, 10 or even 25 
per cent American tariffs imposed on goods made in Mainland China. Back in Taiwan 
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or anywhere else, Taiwanese investors and goods, especially semi-conductors and HD 
drives, are safe from these punitive tariffs. This is also the reason for the 2019 Q1 and 
Q2 macroeconomic indicators, which seem to be weaker than the data forecast for Q3 
and Q4 (see Table 2). Having fears of a possible trade war, the companies performed 
orders before the end of 2018, so the fall-back in 2019 Q1 and Q2 is more a virtual 
than a real economic phenomenon (Lin, 2019).
Before 2016, Tsai’s predecessor opened Taiwan to Mainland China to a great ex-
tent, and implemented reforms the institutional system and the population had not 
been prepared for. For example, under the implementation of the ECFA, the former 
Taiwanese government wanted to abolish the limitation on Chinese investments in 
Taiwan (they must have a Taiwanese partner and they cannot have more than 50 per 
cent of the shares in a company). This was the reason why the Sunflower Movement 
(the forerunner of the current governing party) could be successful among people. 
If KMT wins again it might revert from the New Southbound Policy back to Mainland 
China (Chung, 2019). 
Yeh7 adds that the Cross-Strait trade still works, and 30 per cent of Taiwan’s direct 
export goes to Mainland China, and if we add the indirect export (e.g. via Hong 
Kong), then nearly 50 per cent of the Taiwanese export goods are forwarded to Main-
land China. He explains that in 2019 Q1 alone, Taiwanese capital returned from 
Mainland China in the amount of USD 1 billion, and moreover, USD 11 million capi-
tal from Mainland China’s companies flew to Taiwan (in order to rescue it from the 
China-USA trade war). In 2019 Q1, USD 830 million worth Taiwanese capital was 
invested in the 18 target countries of the New Southbound Policy (Yeh, 2019).
In spite of some hostile voices in political rhetoric, serious conflicts cannot be ex-
pected between Mainland and Taiwan. Interactions and business relations are normal. 
According to the Taiwan Customs statistics, the estimated value of total Cross-Strait 
bilateral trade was USD 20.7 billion in January and February 2019, representing a de-
crease of 5.3 per cent year-on-year. The value for Taiwan’s exports to Mainland China 
has decreased by 7.3 per cent year-on-year to USD 12.5 billion, while the value of im-
ports from Mainland China has decreased by 2.0 per cent year-on-year to USD 8.2 bil-
lion. In January and February 2019, Taiwan’s trade with Mainland China accounted for 
23.1 per cent of Taiwan’s total foreign trade, representing a decrease of 1.1 percentage 
points from 24.2 per cent in 2018. Exports to Mainland China accounted for 26.1 per 
cent of Taiwan’s total exports, down 2.7 percentage points from 28.8 per cent in 2018, 
while imports from Mainland China accounted for 19.6 per cent of Taiwan’s total im-
ports, up 0.8 percentage points from 18.8 per cent in 2018 (MAC, 2019).
Taiwanese investment in Mainland China
According to the Investment Commission MOEA, in Taiwan, in January and February 
2019, the number of approved foreign investment totalled 190 cases representing a 
value of USD 2.5 billion, of which USD 1.0 billion was approved to invest in Mainland 
China. Mainland China attracted 40.8 per cent of Taiwan’s total foreign investment, 
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thus it became the primary destination for Taiwan’s foreign investment. The invest-
ment approved to Mainland China amounted to 43,401 cases between 1991 and the 
end of February 2019, with a value of USD 183.4 billion, or 57.2 per cent of Taiwan’s 
total foreign investment. A total of 86 cases for the investment in Mainland China 
covering post-registration were approved in January and February 2019, represent-
ing a decrease by 18.1 per cent year-on-year (post-registration included), while the 
total value of approved investment in Mainland China including post-registration was 
USD 1.0 billion, up 64.7 per cent year-on-year (post-registration included). Taiwan’s 
investments mainly located in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Tianjin and other areas in 
Mainland China, and the investment values amounted to USD 321.5 million (31.5% 
of the total investment), USD 160.7 million (15.7%), USD 148.1 million (14.5%) and 
USD 105.6 million (10.3%) respectively. Investments were distributed between whole-
sale and retail trade with USD 216.1 million (21.1% of the total direct investment), 
transportation and storage with USD 135.4 million (13.2%), chemical material manu-
facturing with USD 134.2 million (13.1%) and rubber products manufacturing with 
USD 106.6 million (10.4%, MAC, 2019).
Mainland China’s investment in Taiwan
According to the Investment Commission MOEA, Taiwan, the number of approved 
Mainland China investments in Taiwan totalled 18 cases with the amount of USD 
7,405,000 in January and February 2019. The number of approved Mainland China 
investments in Taiwan totalled 1,246 cases with the amount of USD 2.2 billion be-
tween June 2009 and February 2019. They were mainly made into wholesale and retail 
trade, electronics parts and components manufacturing, banking services, and har-
bour services. The amounts invested above industries are USD 601.9 million (27.4% 
of total amount), USD 283.0 million (12.9%), USD 201.4 million (9.2%), and USD 
139.1 million (6.3%), respectively (MAC, 2019).
Cross-Strait visits
According to the China Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the number of Taiwanese 
tourists to Mainland China in 2018 totalled 6.1 million visitors with an increase of 4.5 
per cent year-on-year. The number of Taiwanese tourists to Mainland China between 
1987 and the end of 2018 totalled 105.4 million visitors. The residents of Mainland 
China who visit Taiwan for tourism purposes has been more than those who visit Tai-
wan for economic and trade activities since 2003. According to Taiwan National Im-
migration Agency statistics, there have been 517,790 visitors from Mainland China 
in January and February 2019 with an increase of 2.9 per cent. Among these, 26,797 
visitors to Taiwan for economic and trade related activities representing a decrease by 
6.8 per cent, and 382,003 tourists to Taiwan, representing a decrease by 0.6 per cent. 
In total, 29.3 million Chinese tourists visited Taiwan between 1987 and the end of 
February 2019 (MAC, 2019).
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Table 5: Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China (USD million)
Year
Taiwan Customs Statistics Mainland China Customs Statistics
Exports* Imports* Total Exports* Imports* Total
2002 10,690.0 8,041.3 18,731.3 38,063.1 6,585.9 44,649.0 
2003 23,209.8 11,095.7 34,305.5 49,362.3 9,004.7 58,367.0 
2004 36,722.8 16,891.5 53,614.3 64,778.6 13,545.2 78,323.8 
2005 44,056.3 20,161.6 64,217.9 74,684.4 16,549.6 91,234.0 
2006 52,377.1 24,909.0 77,286.1 87,109.0 20,735.2 107,844.2 
2007 62,928.4 28,221.2 91,149.6 101,021.7 23,458.3 124,480.0 
2008 67,515.8 31,579.7 99,095.5 103,337.6 25,877.9 129,215.5 
2009 54,842.9 24,554.4 79,397.4 85,722.9 20,505.3 106,228.2 
2010 77,949.5 36,255.2 114,204.7 115,693.9 29,676.6 145,370.5 
2011 85,244.4 44,094.8 129,339.2 124,919.9 35,111.9 160,031.8 
2012 82,666.2 41,431.4 124,097.6 132,183.9 36,779.1 168,963.0 
2013 84,122.2 43,345.5 127,467.7 156,636.9 40,643.6 197,280.5 
2014 84,738.1 49,254.3 133,992.4 152,029.5 46,284.8 198,314.3 
2015 73,409.6 45,266.0 118,675.6 143,306.7 44,898.8 188,205.5 
2016 73,878.9 43,990.8 117,869.7 139,217.2 40,373.7 179,590.9 
2017 88,981.2 50,042.7 139,023.9 155,385.6 43,989.8 199,375.4 
2018 96,756.4 53,783.5 150,539.9 177,597.6 48,646.7 226,244.3 
Note: * “Exports” indicate the amount of exports from Taiwan to Mainland China, and “Imports” stand 
for the amount of imports from Mainland China to Taiwan.
Source: The author’s own editing on the basis of MAC, 2019:2
Table 5 shows that since the early 2000’s the volume of trade turnover between Tai-
wan and Mainland China has continuously been growing in both directions. It is also 
visible and interesting that there is a huge gap between the statistical data registered 
by the Taiwanese and by the Chinese customs authorities.
As for the Cross-Strait Relations that he most important task is to build mutual trust. 
If KMT comes back to power, most likely the full implementation of the Cross-Straits 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) would take place. Now only 
the so-called “early harvest list” works, and the rest – including the services-related 
parts of the agreement – is still pending. The latter, however would be of crucial impor-
tance for Taiwan, as in such a case Mainland China’s growing domestic market would 
be much more open to Taiwanese exporters and services providers. As for the short- 
and long-term future of Taiwan and the Cross-Strait Relations, it is an important fact 
that Mainland China has never took over or occupied Taiwan in history, and Taiwan 
firmly wishes to protect its democratic system and society, the rule of law, freedom of 
speech, respect for private ownership and human rights. Taiwan would not surrender, 
over the longer term, and a mutually acceptable variety of the One Country, Two Systems 
(or “one country – two constitutions”) regime could work. The European Union, the 
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United States and other federal states may provide useful models, and perhaps China – 
together with Taiwan – could have two seats in the United Nations (Lin, 2019).
Chung adds that, even if without military conflicts, too strong Cross-Strait eco-
nomic relations might lead to a gradual voluntary surrender of Taiwan to Mainland 
China, and this is a big risk. Taiwanese people wish to keep their democratic rights 
and freedom of speech, and in view of Hong Kong’s recent adverse experiences with 
the central power and the recently introduced social credit system in Mainland China, 
future does not seem to be without difficulties for Taiwanese people (Chung, 2019).
Conclusion
Taiwan faces significant challenges as outbound investments to Mainland China de-
cline. Investors gradually withdraw their capital, but as they need higher revenues, 
they do not invest in Taiwan, but rather look for other opportunities. The New South-
bound Policy serves two goals: it is supposed to provide the Taiwanese government 
with a broader scope and a room to manoeuvre in the international arena, Taiwanese 
investors – under governmental assistance – channel capitals to the Southeast and 
South Asian regions.
Taiwanese investors and the Taiwanese government are scared of the possible impli-
cations of a trade war between the USA and Mainland China. Besides other, mentioned 
reasons, this is the main reason for the sudden outflow of the Taiwanese FDI from 
Mainland China. This huge amount of capital, however, does not return to Taiwan to 
create new jobs and develop new, high value-added industries, rather flows to South-
east Asia, where still focuses on the low-cost and labour-intensive manufacturing sector.
Mainland China has still been Taiwan’s largest export market and in the longer 
run, especially in case of KMT comes back to power, the focus would be reverted to 
Cross-Strait Relations, with special respect to the implementation of full ECFA and its 
extension to the services sector. In such a case the significance and intensity of the 
New Southbound Policy might diminish, or perhaps it would be continued under a 
different name or umbrella.
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